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Abstract—Understanding software change as an evolutionary
process analogous to biological evolution is an increasingly
popular approach to software evolvability but requires some
caution. Issues of evolvability make sense not only for biological
and evolutionary computation systems, but also in the realms
of artifacts, culture, and software systems. Persistence through
time with variation (while possibly spreading) is an analogue to
variation (with heritability). Thus discrete individual replicators
are not strictly necessary for an evolutionary dynamic to take
place. Studying identiﬁed properties that give biological and
artifact evolution the capacity to produce complex adaptive
variation could shed light on how to enhance the evolvability
of software systems in general and of evolutionary computation
in particular. Evolution and evolvability can be compared in
different domains.
But the evolution of software systems is also very unlike that
of biological entities whose existence, persistence, development,
and integrity as single individuals is actively maintained by
the activity of the entities themselves over a long evolutionary
history. Integrity of software systems – i.e. the assumption that
they are well-deﬁned, coherent individuals that develop – is
presupposed by nearly all software process approaches and limits
their effectiveness. Understanding the long-term evolvability of
software systems as they undergo “descent with modiﬁcation”
thus requires much more than a traditional Darwinian approach.
We compile and discuss differences and similarities between
software evolution and other instances evolution toward this end.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper1 we aim to explore the connections be-
tween software evolution and biological evolution (and also
evolutionary computation). All three share obvious common
features in Darwin’s characterization of evolution as “descent
with modiﬁcation”, but less obvious analogies and parallels
also occur (Conrad 1990, Wagner & Altenberg 1996, Ackley
2000, Nehaniv 2000, Nehaniv 2002, van Belle & Ackley 2002,
Nehaniv 2003). These include notions such as modularity,
sensitivity to changing requirements, as well as issues of
context, and control of and types of variability that have for
the most part been studied independently by workers in soft-
ware engineering, evolutionary computation, and evolutionary
biology.
There is growing awareness from academia, industry, and
research communities of the importance of evolvability, tenta-
tively deﬁned as the capacity to vary robustly and adaptively
1† This paper extends and supersedes (Nehaniv 2000, 2002).
over time or generations in digital and natural systems. A
dialogue is beginning to emerge between various workers in
areas that might beneﬁt from a possible common framework
addressing software engineering as well as biological and
evolutionary computation concerns.
Darwinian evolution (characterized by heritable variation
and selection) is not by itself sufﬁcient to account for
the capacity to vary and inherent phenotypic expressions
of ﬁtness.2 Darwinian evolution is deﬁned as a popula-
tion process in which a population of entities (“individu-
als”) of any sort whatsoever (organic or not), undergoes
variation with differing reproductive success of individu-
als based at least in part on heritable characteristics (cf.
[Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995]). Many instances of
Darwinian evolutionary processes can and do occur, some of
them man-made.3
How inheritable information determines, or more generally,
contributes to other properties of the entity is referred to
as the genotype-phenotype mapping.4 Rigidity of genotype-
phenotype mappings, as often seen in artiﬁcial examples of
evolution (such as evolutionary computation), constrains the
dynamics of evolution to a small space of possible biological
or artiﬁcial systems. Open-ended evolution is not possible
under such constraints. In biology, evolution by itself, does
not fully explain the advent of genetic systems, the ﬂexible
genotype-phenotype mappings, nor heritable ﬁtness (Nehaniv
2003). This presents a challenge both to biologists seeking
to understand the capacity of life to evolve and to computer
scientists who seek to harness biological-like robustness and
openness in the evolution of artiﬁcial systems.
In software evolution, there is no obvious clear analogue
of the individual. Should individuals be deﬁned as source
code programs, installations of particular software systems,
2Here and below variability refers to the type of change that individuals
may undergo from generation to generation.
3Caveat: Darwinian evolution does not exclude the inheritance of acquired
traits — indeed, such there is no reason not use such types of (so-called
Lamarckian or, more correctly, non-Weismannian) inheritance for artiﬁcial
evolutionary systems if it proves effective to do so. Moreover, this may well
be a natural type of inheritance in considerations of software evolution (cf.
Wernick 2002).
4Genotype is the inheritable information carried by an individual, while
its phenotype is comprised by all its other properties (including form and
behavior).
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software releases, organizations that produce software, or in
some other way? As a consequence, it is difﬁcult to identify
any population process consisting of such individuals, or
to identify heritable characteristics, or to deﬁne differential
reproductive success. Similarly, what constitutes a “species”?
If it is ability to interbreed, what could this mean for software?
– can Windows 98 interbreed with Windows 2000?
Evolvability in biology has been variously deﬁned as the
“ability to produce adaptive variants when acted on by the
genetic system” (Wagner & Altenberg, 1996), as the “capac-
ity to generate heritable phenotypic variation” (Kirschner &
Gerhart, 1998); and as characterized by ‘evolutionary water-
sheds’ opening the “ﬂoodgates to future evolution”, such as
segmentation and body plans (Dawkins, 1987). On the other
hand, unconstrained or inappropriately constrained variability
can lead to lack of stability, “cancer” (uncontrolled growth at
lower levels), non-heritability of ﬁtness, lack of evolutionary
power, and so on.
In software evolution, since at least the work of Parnas
(1972) and Dijkstra (1968), issues that impact evolvability
have been identiﬁed in the design of software systems (e.g.
structural decomposition, information hiding, modularity, re-
quirements change).
Evolutionary computation has come a long way since Fried-
berg (1959) documented the difﬁculty of introducing random
variation into conventional computer code. It is now possible
to evolve programs to carry out some simple tasks (and some
not-so-simple ones) by introducing appropriately constrained
variability combined with robustness in the face of unfavorable
variations (e.g. Koza 1992).
Software evolution and maintenance present quite different
modes of variability and of descent with modiﬁcation than
in biological or evolutionary computation. In this realm, ro-
bustness to change in context of use (e.g. Goguen 1994) and
inertia of legacy-driven concepts of “the system” (Loomes
& Nehaniv 2001) are key concerns, as well as the lack of
well-deﬁned individuals (Nehaniv 2000, Loomes et al. 2005).
Similar ideas such as (appropriate) modularity, duplication
and subsequent divergence of functionality (cf. Ohno 1970),
redundancy, phenotypic plasticity, trade-offs between freedom
at different levels (e.g. Michod & Roze 1999), and the for-
bidding of undesirable variability while allowing potentially
useful variability are common threads in evolvability issues
across domains. What is the “right” level of abstraction in
considering these issues for software systems?
We discuss these similarities and differences between soft-
ware and other evolutionary domains, and address in what
sense it is possible to transcend these disciplines in the study
and application of evolvability, with particular attention to the
special characteristics of software evolution phenomena.
II. EVOLUTION OF ARTIFACTS AND SOFTWARE
In the realm of culture, “imitation broadly construed” serves
as the replication mechanism for an evolutionary dynamic act-
ing on so-called ‘memes’ (Dawkins 1976) which are somewhat
ill-deﬁned entities which comprise the “replicators” in culture,
including fashion, behaviors such as ways of making a baskets
or food-preparation methods, techniques and technologies,
tools and other artifacts. Social learning and imitation can
play the role of replication supporting a kind of heritability
in human and animal cultures (Dawkins 1976, Bonner 1980).
The capacity for generating adaptive variation, i.e. evolvability,
in the realms of design and culture is evidently very high and
seems to be supporting open-ended evolution.
A. Evolution of Artifacts
Human artifacts including objects we use daily, such as
forks, knives, and paper clips are often said to evolve over
many generations of design and use, in an evolutionary
dynamic in which “form follows failure” - i.e. designers
are inspired by their dissatisfaction with a type of artifact
motivating them to make a new one (Petroski 1992). Other arti-
facts, including computer software, persist over time in niches
with changing requirements. The change in circumstances and
context of their use results in the next “generation” of artifacts
having changed form - whether these are new artifacts based
on the old ones (e.g. a new kind of paper clip) or old artifacts
that have been modiﬁed (a new version of existing software).
Whether these artifacts persist or cease to be used depends
on a kind of selection for functional and non-functional prop-
erties. For example, legacy software systems may continue to
be used because they do essential work and are too expensive
to understand or replace. A model of car may be successful
because of fuel efﬁciency or because it looks fashionably
impressive and attracts consumers. This kind of heritability
analogue (persistence of characters over generations of arti-
facts) makes selectable entities of tools, or of the knowledge
of how to make the tools. ‘Tools’ here includes non-physical
tools such as software development methodologies, theories
of evolution, the decimal expansion, methods of calculation,
algorithms, etc. (Nehaniv 1997). Persistence of ‘species’ of
artifacts and memes in particular economic-ecological niches
combined with variability in their design provides for what
appears to be evolution without [explicit] genetics.
Just as biological individuality has arisen in the origin
of eukaryotes (cells having a nucleus) and of multicellular
lifeforms from the combination of previously reproductively
independent entities, new artifacts and software arise from
the combination of existing components into new artifacts.
Thus persistence with variation and selection (and many other
phenomena seen in organismal evolution) are also present in
the world of artifacts providing a dynamic which we might
perhaps not too metaphorically identify with the heritability,
variation and selection of Darwinian evolution.
B. Tools and Cognition
Tools will tend to be used in accidental ways not anticipated
by their designers. Tool design will change as a result of hu-
man needs and desires, and tools will change the humans who
use them. Designs that can support requirements change while
continuing to meet human needs will be more “evolutionarily
pregnant” (to use Dawkins’ phrase) - i.e. more evolvable.
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Evolvable systems are “easy to sellotape”, i.e. easy to adapt
and modify in the face of external changes and unforeseen
circumstances (cf. Gatlin 1972).
Ever since humans (and their ancestors) started extend-
ing their capabilities with tools, we have been “cyborgs” -
organisms whose embodiment is modiﬁed and extended via
technologies (Haraway 1991, Nehaniv 1997, Clark 2003).
Tools change what we are and how we interact with our
world, e.g. spoons, drums, clothing, eye glasses, money, lan-
guage, writing, arithmetic, etc. Designers externalize ideas for
magnifying human capacity through the artifacts they create.
Conversely, the design and use of artifacts often impacts
human cognition in many unforeseen ways. The tools and
artifacts that humans design change our interaction with the
world around us. Evolutionary pathologies (in biology or other
evolutionary systems) are the persistence or accumulation of
undesirable features that may lead to disaster in the long-term,
simply as a consequence of evolutionary dynamics – cf. the
notion of “tragedy of the commons” and other examples from
[Altenberg 2000]. In order to avoid evolutionary pathology in
technological evolution it is useful to ask when designing any
new artifact: How will it serve the interests of people? How
will it enhance human cognitive and social capabilities? What
will be the technologically induced adaptations of humans
to the artifact? Does it, and, if so, how does it integrate
technological and human processes while respecting human
wholeness? Issues of ethics and of empowerment arise with
the introduction of new artifacts. How will this tool affect
human cognition and behavior? How will using and interacting
with this technology change who we are? Will it, and, if so,
how will it help optimize the relationship between the “CYB”
and “ORG” (Mey 1997, Gorayska & Mey 1996, Dautenhahn
& Nehaniv 2000). Tools “conﬁgure” their users: the users
of tools must adapt to themselves to their tools. What kind
of cognitive calluses might the use of an artifact engender?
(Nehaniv 1999). If a tool proliferates, what will be the impact
on the environment? And, pragmatically, to what extent are
questions such as these submerged in the face of technology-
driven and economic demands or imperatives?
C. Evolution of Software
In software engineering, change in requirements and context
of use is the major factor in cost and impacts the areas of
requirements engineering, software maintenance, and software
evolution. Evolvability as a capacity to generate adaptive
variation in tandem with continued persistence of software
artifacts would be welcome in software engineering. Factors
supporting evolvability in artifact and software design, systems
theory, and digital evolution have analogues in biological
evolvability. Certain properties of artifacts and of software
are recognized as enhancing their capacity to support and be
adapted to changing requirements and context of use, yielding
ﬂexibility of use and variability tolerance.
Software maintenance - the process of changing a software
system after its release - is the most expensive part of software
costs, estimated as accounting for as much as 80% or more of
effort (e.g. Sommerville 1996, ch. 22; Pressman 1992, ch. 20;
Lehman 2005). Corrective, adaptive, and perfective mainte-
nance of software to satisfy mutable requirements provides a
mechanism for inheritance and (highly non-random) variabil-
ity of software artifacts. Requirements, economic and power
relationships, accountability, and usefulness of the software
in functioning in context all contribute to the dynamic and
social process of software requirements engineering as the
reconciliation of technical and social issues (Goguen 1994,
1996). Brittleness of current software systems in the face
of requirements change is thus a huge problem for software
engineering. Existing software is not robust against changing
requirements and contexts of use.
Re-use (not replication), modularity, information hiding, en-
capsulation, and object-oriented ‘inheritance’ are some mech-
anisms that software engineers have developed in order to
provide robustness to environmental and requirements change
in the course of software evolution. These are intended to
improve the capacity of software for adaptation. Nevertheless,
practical methodologies and theoretical understanding of how
to build maintainable software are still for the most part wide
open research areas. We still do not have really good methods
for how to grow or evolve software systems.
III. EVOLVABILITY IN BIOLOGY AND EVOLUTIONARY
COMPUTATION
Recently it has grown increasingly clear that evolutionary
biology still lacks a complete account of the capacity of
populations of living systems to change their architectures and
increase in complexity in the course of evolution. We have
only very limited knowledge of the origins and evolution of
genotypes and of genotype-phenotype relations. Whereas most
population geneticists start with the assumption of a ﬁxed
-often abstract- genetic system, experience in evolutionary
computation shows that the choice of genetic representation
and the mechanisms for variability crucially affect the capacity
of the evolution to produce non-lethal phenotypic adaptations
(Altenberg 1995, Wagner & Altenberg 1996, Kirschner &
Gerhart 1998).
Thus the evolvability of life on earth - the capacity to pro-
duce complex adaptations, such has new metabolic pathways,
organs, and body plans - is not really explained by merely
saying that it must “somehow” be a result of Darwinian evo-
lution (since many artiﬁcial instances of Darwinian evolution
lead to no such adaptations). Evolution, at least in evolu-
tionary computation, obviously fails even on many simple
optimization tasks if the genotype-phenotype relationship is
brittle, e.g. when variability is produced by varying bits or
characters in standard computer programs (Friedberg 1959).5
In contrast to such brittleness in the face of variation, when
variation is less likely to be lethal and more likely to have
a non-negligible chance of producing useful adaptation, even
populations of computer code entities can exhibit complex
5It is interesting to note that similar techniques are sometimes now used to
do coverage analysis for assertion violation as an application of variability to
debugging.
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evolutionary adaptations, as shown by the examples of genetic
programming (Koza 1992) and self-replicating programs in
Tierra (Ray 1992). Populations of individuals with robust
‘encoding’ are more evolvable (cf. Gatlin 1972), and artiﬁcial
examples have produced human-competitive applications in
the design of electronic circuits (Koza & Bennett 1999, Koza
2003) and aeronautics (Bannasch 2001).
IV. INDIVIDUALITY, PERSISTENCE AND THE
HERITABILITY OF FITNESS
A. Evolvability without Explicit Genetics
Certain classes of artifacts persist either through successive
generations of design, or merely as (possibly modiﬁed) sin-
gle instances as they continue to be used. The context and
requirements of use change with time in ways that cannot
be foreseen - during initial design and development, and
also after deployment. Software systems go through various
versions and releases, and software components are combined
and re-used in new ways. Behaviors, technologies, and ideas
are transmitted between individuals, often with variation and
persistence over long periods. Without a genetic system, could
there be an evolutionary dynamic present in these examples?
If so, how is it instantiated and in which cases do we see
a signiﬁcant capacity to evolve complex adaptations? What
factors support this kind of evolvability?
B. Mergers of Selectable Entities
Biological organisms reproduce and thus form readily iden-
tiﬁable entities comprising populations in which the ingredi-
ents of evolution -heritability, variation, selection- are found.
During major evolutionary transitions such as the origin of
differentiated multicellular organisms, in which new levels of
individuality arise (comprised of pre-existing smaller repli-
cators), what is meant by “ﬁtness”, and questions of its
heritability at various levels are complex issues (Buss 1987,
Michod & Roze 1999). Another example of new selectable
entities arises in symbiogenesis, i.e. the advent of new species
or higher level individuals from mergers of organisms living
in close proximity to one another (e.g. one inside the other).
For instance, “gardens of bacteria” whose reproductive fates
became inextricably intertwined (Margulis 1983) gave rise via
symbiogenesis to the ﬁrst eukaryotic cells, having components
including a nucleus, numerous energy ‘powerhouses’ (mito-
chondria), and other components (organelles) that were derived
from simpler, previously free-living, bacterial ancestors. At
intermediate stages of such transitions, replication at the higher
level is uncertain; ﬁtness at a new level has not yet congealed
and is still becoming heritable.
In the case of software, re-use and combining of modules,
code, or programs together into more complex systems is
reminiscent of such evolutionary mergers. The merged struc-
tures can then in turn themselves become the focus of further
software evolution.
C. Growth by Accretion
Large software systems’ growth is often characterized by
accumulation of layers of legacy, gradual addition of small
parts and changes, and of re-use of structure without much
regard for what underlies it. Such growth by accretion sug-
gests that in some ways software change may be more like
coral reef growth than, say, bacterial evolution. From this
point of view, software evolutionary processes are far from
Darwinian evolution and more like the growth of a colony of
organisms that interacts with and transforms its environment
(cf. [Jackson, Buss, and Cook 1986]).
D. Persistence as Weak Heritability
A new level of individuality implies a niche for the new
individuals to make their living in. Even before individual
ﬁtness at the new level becomes heritable, entities occupying
the niche have an obvious property: they persist in the niche.
The persistence of entities through time is a property of a
population evolving in its environment and (possibly changing)
niche.6
Natural selection acts to determine whether an individual’s
properties will persist. Thus although successful characteristics
of an individual may certainly be inherited by its offspring,
survival of the individual itself already entails the persis-
tence of that individual’s properties. Persistence is therefore
a (weaker) analogue of heritability. Can one make sense of
evolution in the absence of heritability? Yes, persistence in a
niche - possibly with variability and with spread over time
- plays the same role as heritability in natural extensions of
the Darwinian paradigm (Nehaniv 2000). This new view of
persistence makes it possible to extend this paradigm more
generally into the realm of artifacts and design. Without
our necessarily being able to identify any discrete, self-
reproducing entities, persistence through time while possibly
growing and spreading serves the same role as heritability does
in a classical Darwinian paradigm.
A degenerate case of this is persistence without change,
growth, or variation - e.g. of a stone existing without sub-
stantial change over a long period of geological time. A
less degenerate case is growth and spread without variability,
e.g. in the growth of crystals. Persistence with growth and
variation is apparent in the lifespan of single living things,
maintained software systems, coral reefs, cities, and many
other entities; within these cases we have persistence and
variability providing analogues of heritability without strict
reproduction of individuals. Design and cultural traditions,
and generations of software releases, provide examples closer
to biological evolution acting on populations but still lack
well-deﬁned self-reproducing individuals. Looking at these as
examples along a continuum from persistence of entities to
reproduction of self-reproducing individuals generalizes the
notion of Darwinian evolution to many other realms having
6These considerations of persistence in a niche are related to but not
directly dependent on the notion of ‘species’. A species (in addition to having
other characteristic properties) consists of a population of individuals whose
lineages persist within a common niche.
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many similarities. In particular, in each case one can ask
about the capacity of the generalized evolutionary system to
produce adaptive variation. That is, one can study evolvability
phenomena and the factors that support them in these systems.
It turns out that many non-biological systems showing the
capacity for generating adaptive variation share many features
with biological ones.
V. PROPERTIES OF EVOLVABLE SYSTEMS
For artifacts (including software) we can deﬁne evolvability
as the capacity of the systems, organizations and networks
producing them to give rise to adaptive variants that ﬂexibly
meet changing requirements over the course of long-term
change.
Many of the properties thought to enhance software evolv-
ability are strongly analogous to properties considered to be
of great importance in biological evolvability and evolvability
in evolutionary computation. A very incomplete list of (non-
orthogonal) factors includes (see cited references for more
details):
1) Modularity - low interdependence (‘pleiotropy’) be-
tween functionally distinct components, correspondence
of units of coding with units of function (biology:
Conrad, 1990, Wagner & Altenberg 1996; software:
information hiding and encapsulation (Parnas 1972);
cf. functional decomposition, structured programming
(Dijkstra 1968), and “object-orientation”); weak linkage;
compartmentation.
2) Facilitation of extra-dimensional bypass (Conrad 1990),
e.g. via duplication and divergence (Ohno 1970, Nehaniv
& Rhodes 2000): the creation of new routes for evolu-
tionary change by adding new dimensions for potential
adaptive variation.
3) Robustness to genetic variability (Conrad 1990, Ray
1992, Koza 1992)
4) Phenotypic robustness, developmental tolerance and
constraints, embryologies (Conrad 1990; Gerhart &
Kirschner 1997; Kirschner & Gerhart 1998; West-
Eberhard 1998; Maynard Smith et al. 1985); Baldwin’s
effect (the internalization, over generations, of adapta-
tion to external evolutionary pressures).
5) Redundancy: belt-and-suspenders phenomena; duplica-
tion of components (von Neumann 1956).
6) Switches - use-retargetable mechanisms which various
different kinds of signals could be conﬁgured to control
(via ‘signal transduction’); re-use; genetic regulatory
networks, transcriptional control; homeotic genes and
developmental cascades; hierarchical organization (Si-
mon 1969); informational patterning; positional systems
in development (L. Wolpert); interoperability.
7) Conservation of Core Mechanisms, Diversiﬁcation of
Regulatory Mechanisms; customization and re-use.
8) Robustness to environmental and context change - fault-
tolerance, requirements engineering, defensive program-
ming: results in (1) reduced lethality due to muta-
tions or varied environmental conditions; (2) support
of phenotypically useful traits without ‘genetic’ change,
modulated to provide (3) control of kind and amount of
phenotypic variation produced to achieve a functional
state regardless of initial conﬁguration and perturbation
of external factors.
9) Search behavior in biological systems: exploratory epi-
genetic mechanisms for variation and selection - har-
nessing evolutionary dynamics: within an individual
(Gerhart & Kirschner 1997) - e.g. the formation (accord-
ing to Darwinian dynamics) of temporary scaffolding
structures (via microtubule synthesis) in cytoskeleton
(cell skeleton), in cell motility, and in reproductive
cell functions (meiosis and mitosis); in self-organizing
processes in ant foraging behavior; in neural and vas-
cular growth and morphogenesis; in evolution within
an immune system; as well as learning, adaptation, and
evolution (Holland 1975).
10) Genotype-Phenotype relations or variability generation
mechanisms under evolutionary control.
Selection for robustness can have as a non-selected by-
product the following properties which enhance evolv-
ability: (1) phenotypic variation becomes tolerated and
possible; (2) phenotypic variability becomes heritable,
since similar genes in similar environment yield similar
development; and (3) developmental versatility leads to
increased phenotypic variability serving as fodder for
the “next round of evolution”.
VI. EVOLVABILITY OF SOFTWARE
A. Presupposition of Individual Integrity
A serious problem, in our view, of most models of software
development and evolution is their blind acceptance of the
“life cycle” metaphor that tacitly presupposes the integrity of
a software system as a single coherent individual which will
“develop” properly from an “embryonic” requirements spec-
iﬁcation to a “mature” software system if properly cared for
(Lam and Loomes 1998, Loomes and Jones 1998, Loomes and
Nehaniv 2001, Loomes et al. 2005). However, this viewpoint
is dangerous if “the system” does not refer to any well-deﬁned
entity (e.g. before requirements are discussed), or if it refers
to a multitude of vaguely deﬁned entities of questionable on-
tological status (given e.g. by user expectations, speciﬁcation
documents, etc.) which may or may not have any existence as a
working “system”, or even to a multitude of deployed systems
under the same product name (such as ‘Microsoft Windows’)
– see (Loomes et al. 2005) for a detailed discussion of this.
This situation in software development and evolution is
radically unlike the case in biological evolution, where indi-
vidual growing and developing organisms actively acquire and
metabolize the resources necessary to construct and maintain
their own persistent individual bodies and integrity in the face
of harsh entropic challenges from the surrounding universe.
Software systems in contrast generally take no active role in
their maintenance, but persist due to inertia or active work
on the part of human communities of actors. Nevertheless,
stakeholders and organizations committed to a developing
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system can bring about massive absorptions of resources into
attempts to promote a system’s realization and integrity – cf.
(Latour 1987, Wernick et al. - this volume).
Given the considerations on lack of clear individuals in
software evolution discussed here, it is abundantly clear that
the existence and persistence of single entity over a longer
temporal extent is no longer to be taken for granted when
we move from the world of organisms or everyday objects
into the world of software. It might even be the case that the
notion of a developing individual – “the system” is not an
appropriate metaphor in the realm of software maintenance
and evolvability.
B. Evolution, Naming and Persistence Entities
Naming of objects and natural phenomena – whether in-
dividuals or classes of them – works in a particular way that
generally pre-supposes the existence, integrity, and the contin-
ued persistence of the entities named. When we name persons
or animals these assumptions are naturally satisﬁed, and we are
able to give a name without much ambiguity to a person even
the individual changes and develops through radically different
forms in the course of life [Loomes et al. 2005]. Biological
organisms have a natural persistence and integrity that allows
us to do this. Our usual ways of using giving things names
have been co-opted (or “exapted”, i.e. re-used and adapted
for unanticipated applications over the course of time) to a
new realm when we apply naming to software systems. Mean-
while, software systems and their often dynamically changing
identities and characteristics emerge from and are transformed
by the activity of networks of actors working in contexts
of internal, external, technological and social constraints and
requirements.
In evolutionary computation or in biological systems, there
is generally a good measure of agreement on what constitutes
an individual in an evolving population. In software evolution,
such agreement is markedly absent. (In cases where it seems
to exist, it is the result of tacit acceptance of an arbitrary
norm, e.g. in version numbering, rather than logical necessity
or rational inquiry.)
C. Individuals – Units of Selection
Darwin’s broad sense of evolution in organismal species
as “descent with modiﬁcation” applies at the level of pop-
ulations of the individuals in a species over time un-
dergoing a dynamical process with heritability, variability,
selection (“struggle for existence”) and limited resources.
Populations rather than individuals evolve (although indi-
viduals may change and develop in their life times (as,
for example, in the life cycle of a butterﬂy), but well-
deﬁned individuals are required for the Darwinian theory
to apply [Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995], [Buss 1987],
[Michod 1999]. Persistence of changing entities becomes a
weaker analogue of individuals in an evolutionary dynamic
and occurs also for other candidate spheres of evolutionary
phenomena such as memes, software, or physical technologi-
cal artifacts ([Nehaniv 2000] and above).
The software engineering community uses the term ‘evo-
lution’ in a broader sense that also focuses on the descent
with modiﬁcation of software systems, but does not actually
presuppose populations of competing individuals of the same
species. Competition is instead for a given niche, and the
makers of new software products may seek to invade, create
or expand software niches.
Where software systems are seen as being modiﬁed and
maintained in the face of changing requirements and contexts
of use [Goguen 1994], [Lam and Loomes 1998], selection is
not usually discussed, but explicit empirical laws for the
evolution of particular classes of software systems can be
formulated [Lehman 1980].
D. Genes, Species, Individuals
Even more importantly, software evolution differs from
biological evolution in a fundamental manner: There is cur-
rently no well-circumscribed notion of what constitutes an
individual software system, nor of heritable material, nor of
species. The lack of clear-cut software individuals is a serious
obstruction to the use of Darwinian evolutionary analogues
for software. Related to this is the fact that one has no clear
analogue of ‘gene’, the unit of heritable material. Genetics
in biology does not completely determine or ‘specify’ an
individual, but constrains its potentialities for developing in
interaction with its environment. Genes are what make these
potentialities heritable and subject to natural selection. In
software evolution, it might be otherwise, e.g. program code
may determine software behavior completely; but for software,
no one has as yet produced a compelling answer to the
question “what is [or should be] a gene?”
Biological species are often deﬁned by the capacity to
interbreed, and by isolation or barriers to breeding outside the
group. For software, what should constitute a species has no
obvious clear answer. Software does reproduce by interbreed-
ing: incremental releases are in some sense uniparental, and
systems that combine multiple software components can not be
usefully said to be of the same species as their components.7
Could we see the customization of a generic software
product via parameters and installation options as phenotype
variation? Would this put the generic product in the role of
species and the individual copy as individual? Customization
could also form the basis of ideas for changes in future
releases. Perhaps a ‘system as ﬁelded’ could be considered
an individual, and its lines of code or its constituent modules
might be considered as ‘genes’ (potentially inheritable – re-
useable – in other programs). However, all these suggestions
are highly debatable, and many alternative, equally plausible,
but conﬂicting interpretations of gene, species, and individual
in the realm of software seem possible.
7This last example seems to be closer to an instance of symbiogenesis,
the creation of new species by mergers of old ones – see above and
[Margulis and Sagan 2003].
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Modularity, genotype-phenotype relations, the ability to
replicate, heritability of ﬁtness, and evolvability are derived
states of biological systems that have scientiﬁc explanations
(some currently still being worked out). Integrity of coherent
individuals cannot be presupposed for software evolution.
Persistence over time with variational change can play the
role of heritability with variation in a Darwinian (but not
necessarily Weismannian evolutionary dynamic). From this
point of view, evolution and evolvability of artifacts and soft-
ware systems, designs, culture and memes can be compared.
Studying the properties that make such evolution possible, and
that make biological and cultural systems exhibit evolvability,
shed useful light on ways to improve evolutionary computation
and the design and evolution of software systems in general.
This study also reveals a cross-disciplinary unity at a high
level of the mechanisms of evolvability in different realms
including biology, artifacts, culture, and software systems, but
with some very important differences that cannot be ignored.
Software evolution is quite different from biological evolu-
tion or instances of evolution in artiﬁcial life and evolutionary
computation. This is due in large part to the lack of an
adequate analogue of individual. Software systems at present
do not have ‘inherent coherence’: unlike biological individuals
they do not at present engage actively in their own production,
self-maintenance, and adaptation to the environment. The
dynamics of reiﬁcation, persistence, and continuity of software
“individuals”, as well as an explicit, defensible deﬁnition of
the term (or, alternatively, of an analogous concept replacing
the notion of “individual”), must be addressed by a successful
theory of software evolution.
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